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Abstract
When two firms play an infinite time horizon game with trig­
ger price strategies, the collusive equilibrium is sustainable pro­
vided the discount factor is relatively close to 1. In this paper 
I show that, when products are differentiated, firms can always 
sustain some degree of collusion for whatever value of the dis­
count factor. This result is fairly general since it does not depend 
on the way product differentiation is modelled. I then examine 
under which conditions the introduction of multimarket contact 
can increase the degree of collusion in these games. Here, the out­
come depends on whether a spatial or a quadratic utility model 
is used to model product differentiation. It seems that a spa­
tial model leaves more room to firms to increase the degree of 
collusion, at least when the number of competitors is sufficiently 
small.
*1 would like to thank L. Phlips and S. Martin for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
Special thanks to Kristina Kostial for her help in word processing and editing. Needless 






















































































































































































The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of product differ­
entiation in a multimarket contact model. Multimarket contact is defined 
as a situation in which the same firms meet in several, separated markets. 
Collusion shall be defined as any level of profits/prices that exceeds the 
Bertrand-Nash level of profits/prices. Optimal or maximal collusion is then 
equivalent to the joint profit maximization level with a price pf?. In their pa­
per on multimarket contact and collusive behavior, Bemheim and Whinston 
(1990) show that - under certain conditions - the existence of multimarket 
contact fosters collusion when compared to a situation where the constel­
lation of competitors varies in each market. In applying Bemheim and 
Whinston’s basic concept, I will analyse the behavior of two firms producing 
a differentiated commodity and selling it in two separated markets.
In a price competition game over an infinite time horizon, trigger 
strategies imply that deviation from the collusive path has very severe con­
sequences when played with homogeneous products. Since a marginal devi­
ation from the collusive price is sufficient for the deviating firm to capture 
the entire market during the deviation period, punishment for this defec­
tion will lead to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of pricing at marginal cost. 
Introducing product differentiation in this framework definitely alters the 
collusive outcome. Unfortunately however, we cannot determine the direc­
tion of the impact of product heterogeneity on the collusive outcome a priori. 
This stems from the fact that product differentiation has two opposing ef­
fects on collusive equilibria. On the one hand, it decreases the severity 
of punishments because the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with differentiated 
products yields positive profits for the rivals U Hence, post-deviation profits 
are no longer zero; this counts for the deviator(s) as well as for the pun­
ishing firm(s). This fact reduces the relative losses from deviation in all 
post-deviation periods. We may therefore speak of the negative (contra-) ef­
fect of product differentiation on the collusive outcome. On the other hand, 
the gains from deviation decrease as well. Unlike in the homogeneous prod­
uct case, the deviator has to decrease its own price more than marginally 1
1 At least in the standard case where upward sloping reaction functions with different 




























































































in order to maximize its profits during the deviation period * I2. We may call 
this the positive (pro-) effect of product differentiation on collusion.
Consequently, the effect that dominates determines whether product 
differentiation enhances collusion or not. If we measure the degree of collu­
sion with the minimum value of the discount factor required to sustain the 
collusive outcome, we can modify our initial question and ask whether the 
degree of product differentiation decreases or increases the critical value of 
the discount factor of the collusive equilibrium.
Section 2 introduces Bernheim and Whinston’s basic argument on mul­
timarket contact. An overview over the two standard approaches to model 
product differentiation is given in section 3. Section 4 links product differen­
tiation to the multimarket contact model and discusses how Bernheim and 
Whinston’s mechanism works in the models of the previous section. Finally, 
section 5 concludes with a remark on the scope and the limitations of the 
results.
2 The Effect of Product Differentiation in 
the Bernheim and Whinston Model
In one subsection of their paper on multimarket contact and collusive be­
havior, Bernheim and Whinston examine the range of collusive equilibria 
when products are differentiated. For this purpose they set up the follow­
ing assumptions. Two firms i — 1,2 sell a differentiated commodity in two 
markets k =  a,b with constant unit cost c* which is equal for both firms. 
Information is complete throughout the game. Further, it is supposed that 
product differentiation is symmetric. With respect to the discount factor 
6. Bernheim and Whinston assume that the maximum collusive price to be 
sustainable increases continuously as 8 rises 3. However, the degree of collu­
sion may differ between markets even though 8 remains the same for both
2 Optimal defection requires a firm i to jum p to its reaction function, since the reaction 
function comprises all best-response prices for any given price pj o f the rival.
‘ I will explain the argumentation behind this assumption in the next section where
I give an overview over two different approaches to model product heterogeneity and its




























































































firms and markets 4 5. One could imagine a situation where products are more 
differentiated in market a than in market b (see Figure la and lb )
According to Bernheim and Whinston, a specific discount factor could 
be sufficient to sustain the maximum collusive level in market a (point A 
where the isoprofit-curves of the two firms have a tangency point), while only 
a lower level of collusion can be achieved in market b (point B where two 
isoprofit-curves intersect at a level above the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, 
point Nb). As in the homogeneous product case, firms deviate through 
undercutting the collusive price in each market and maximize their one- 
period profit from deviation (points Da and Db). If a firm decides to deviate 
it will do so in both markets since it knows that it will be punished for 
deviation in both markets anyway.
To determine the optimal collusive outcome under multimarket con­
tact, Bernheim and Whinston set up the joint profit maximization function
maxp (n ia +  n it) i =  l.'2 (1)
and maximize (1) subject to
^i(Pa) +  $i(Pb) +  J ~  ^(1'ia +  Vib) < -  l_  ̂ ( n ta +  n i6) i —  1 , 2  (2 )
where $i(pk) is the one-period optimal deviation level and vlb is the post- 
deviation profit of firm i in market k. Thus, for collusion to be sustainable, 
(2) must be fulfilled. The solution of this problem implies that
dUig/dpa _  dUib/dpb 
d^ia/dpa d îb/dpb
Bernheim and Whinston conclude from (3) that multimarket contact makes 
it possible for firms to equalize marginal profits from collusion to marginal
4Bernheim and Whinston give no explanation for this. In my opinion, it can only arise 
from the fact that the degree o f product differentiation differs across markets. Then, 
making the assumption that the minimum discount factor for collusion rises with the 
degree of product substitutability, a common S may be in line with different degrees of 
collusion.
5The 45° line reflects the fact that the reaction functions in the figure are mirrored 
because product differentiation is symmetric. By the same token, collusive prices and 




























































































profits from deviation across markets. The reason why this possibility may 
increase each firm’s overall profits is illustrated by an example. Suppose that 
for a given <5, optimal collusion (i.e. the joint profit maximization outcome, 
the point at which two iso-profit curves of the two rivals are at a tangency 
point) is just sustainable in market a whereas some lower collusive level is 
sustainable in market b. Thus, it has to be true that
3IIia/dpa =  0 and dY\lh/dpb >  0. (4)
This would be the solution for the single market setting. With multimar­
ket contact, (3) suggests that firms can improve overall profits for the two 
markets through increasing marginal profits from collusion in market a and 
decreasing marginal profits from collusion in market b. This would involve 
agreement on a joint decline in the collusive price in market a and on a joint 
increase in the collusive price in market b.
There is an intuitive argument behind the fact that firms gain from 
equalizing marginal profits across markets. As marginal profits approach 
zero, the value of one additional unit of profits is steadily declining. If a 
firm can swap one unit of profits in market a against one unit in market 6, 
it makes a gain since
3IIia/3 p a <  dUib/dpb (5)
until (5) holds with equality.
3 Models of Product Differentiation and the 
Effect on Sustainable Collusion
Generally speaking, there exist two different approaches to model horizon­
tal product differentiation. The first one is a spatial approach, based on 
Hotelling’s model (1929) on stability in competition. The degree of product 
differentiation is measured by the distance between the production/selling 
locations of two commodities in a certain product space. If for instance this 
product space consists in an interval of a certain length, the further away two 
product locations, the more differentiated the two respective commodities.
The second approach goes back to Chamberlin (1933) and is derived 




























































































by Spence (1976) and further developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1979). It has 
the convenient property of yielding linear inverse demand functions. Firm 
Vs price pi is a linear function of its own quantity q, and the quantity of 
the competing commodity, qj 6. If both quantities influence pt with equal 
weights, the two goods are homogeneous.
Both types of models have been examined with respect to the degree of 
collusion sustainable in oligopolistic supergames over an infinite time hori­
zon. Below, I will give a brief description of some of these studies together 
with a comparison of their results concerning the collusive outcome.
3.1 The Spatial Model
In a recent article Chang (1991) investigates the impact of product differ­
entiation in collusive pricing in a spatial competition model. The basic- 
framework concerning the modelling of spatial differentiation is equivalent 
to that of Neven (1985). Two firms i =  1,2, located at x, =  X\, x2 within an 
interval of length [0,1], engage in an infinitely repeated price game of simul­
taneous competition. Consumers are uniformly distributed over [0,1] where 
the location of a consumer represents its most preferred product. Each con­
sumer has a reservation price r and he will purchase one unit of his most 
preferred variety (which consists in the product that is located the closest 
to his own location) up to a price of r. The consumer measures product dif­
ferentiation with a transportation cost according to the distance of his own 
location and the location of the two products. Following d ’Aspremont et al. 
(1979), transportation costs are assumed to be quadratic which implies that 
the marginal transportation cost increases with the distance to the product.
Since the purpose of the analysis is to look at the influence of different 
degrees of product heterogeneity on the level of collusion, product locations 
are taken to be exogenous to the model. The closer two products are lo­
cated within the interval, the higher the degree of substitutability between 
them. Throughout the investigation it is assumed that products are located 
symmetrically at X\ =  x and x2 =  1 — x. At the beginning of each period
6In an oligopolistic framework with n firms, the quantities o f all competing com m odi­
ties qj =  1, ...,n  will enter firm i ’s inverse demand function. For the purpose o f this 




























































































t, each firm chooses a price Pi(t) out of its strategy set Si 7. Pi(t) lies in the 
interval [0,r]. Firms are assumed to play trigger strategies, i.e. to start at 
the collusive price level in period t — 1. Players continue to adhere to the 
collusive agreement for all subsequent periods provided that no player devi­
ated from the collusive price in the previous period. If deviation occurred 
in period t, prices drop to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in period t +  1. If 
a firm deviates, it chooses its best-response price pf for the collusive price 
that is charged by its rival. This implies that the deviation price of firm i 
must lie on its reaction function RFt. Note that there are two possibilities: 
either firm i shares the market with its rival during the deviation period or 
firm i decreases its deviation price sufficiently to capture the entire market. 
The latter occurs whenever the best-response price for a collusive price of 
the rival lies above the kink of the deviator’s reaction function.
As Friedman (1971) pointed out, if the discount factor 6 is sufficiently 
high, joint profit maximization may become the equilibrium outcome in this 
game. In order to determine the required b to sustain joint profit maximiza­
tion, Chang sets up a loss and a revenue function from deviation. Thus, each 
firm finds it more profitable to collude than to deviate if the loss exceeds the 
gain from deviation. The loss from deviation consists in
l (pm, 6)  =  (rrg) (n? -  nf). (6)
where I l f  are firm t's profits from collusion and I l f  are its profits from the 
Nash equilibrium. Equation (6) measures the discounted foregone profits 
if firm i defects from the joint profit maximizing price pM in the current 
period. Since deviation is punished by a reversion to the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium, it will deprive firm i from collecting the collusive profit in all 
future periods. The revenues from deviation on the other hand are
r (pm) = nf -  nf (7)
where I l f  represents firm Vs profit from optimally defecting from pM. From 
(7) it is obvious that deviation is rewarded with a one-shot gain since I l f  >  
I l f . Now, if
L(pM,6 )> R (p M) (8) 7




























































































for each firm, then joint profit maximization is an equilibrium strategy.
To see that there exists a critical boundary for b £ [0,1] from which on 
the collusive equilibrium will be sustainable, we can argue as follows: while 
L(pM. 6) is monotonically increasing in 6, R{pM) does not depend at all on 
6. Hence, since
lirrifj^iL(pM16) — oo (9)
there must exist some 6* for which
L(pM,6 )> R {p M) if 5 >  6*. (10)
Equivalently, it can be shown that there exists a collusive price range 
pc  € {pN ■ pM) which is sustainable under a discount factor 6 <  6* (see 
Figure 2). This would correspond to a situation where two iso-profit curves 
intersect above the Bertrand-Nash point. In other words, unless 6 =  0, 
there always exists a collusive price pc  > pN which is sustainable under any 
discount factor 6 £ (0,1].
In order to examine the effect of product differentiation on sustain­
able collusion, Chang calculates the respective 6* as the products become 
closer substitutes. His result implies that collusion is more difficult to sus­
tain when products become more homogeneous. In other words, the critical 
discount factor 6* to support the collusive equilibrium increases monotoni­
cally with decreasing product differentiation. Thus, in Chang's analysis, the 
temptation to deviate decreases with the increase in the distance of product 
locations. Apparently, the pro-effect of product differentiation on the collu­
sive outcome dominates the contra-effect in this model, a result which holds 
for any difference in product location as x goes from zero to 1/2.
3.2 The Quadratic Utility Model
Deneckere (1983) and Ross (1992) 8 employ a quadratic utility model to 
investigate the impact of product differentiation on collusive equilibria. Ac­
8In fact, Ross’ model is exactly the same as Deneckere’s, thus leading to the same 
results as well. For this reason, I will refer to the quadratic utility model on product 




























































































cordingly, the inverse demand functions in these models are given by
( 11)
(1 2 )
Pi =  a -  bqt -  eqj 
Pj =  a — bqj — eg,
in the two firm case i , j  — 1,2 with average zero cost. Though Deneckere 
examines also the case where products are complements and where firms 
choose quantity instead of price, I will restrict this summary to product 
substitutability and price competition. The degree of product differentiation 
is measured by the ratio a =  e/b which lies in the range of [0,1] for all e <  b. 
While for a =  1, products are perfect substitutes, a =  0 represents the case 
where products are completely independent of each other.
Determining critical values for 6 above which collusion can be sustained 
is done in the way as in Chang’s model. After the Nash profits TI;V, the collu­
sive profits I l f  from the joint profit maximization function and the deviation 
profits I l f  have been calculated, Deneckere measures the degree of sustain­
able collusion with an equation equal to (8). As in Chang, (8) is computed 
by equalizing (6) and (7). Despite this equivalence in the formal procedure, 
Deneckere’s results concerning the critical values 6* are quite different from 
the previous model. In contrast to Chang, he finds a non-monotonic relation­
ship between 6* and the degree of product differentiation. More precisely, 
the minimum value for 6 =  6* to support the collusive equilibrium increases 
and then decreases again as the products become closer substitutes. In fact, 
6* rises from a =  0 until a =  0.73 and decreases from there on until a =  1, 
i.e. until the two products are perfect substitutes. Consequently, collusive 
outcomes are less likely when products are moderate substitutes than when 
they are close substitutes or relatively independent.
Despite these differences in the shape of 6* between both models, we 
can state the following:
Proposition 1: For any 6 < 6* it can be shown that there exists a 
pc  € (pN, pM) in the quadratic utility model.
For this purpose I set up a two-firm model very similar to Deneckere’s, 
with inverse demand functions as in (11) and (12). Without loss of generality 
I assume 6 =  1. e € [0,1] measures then the degree of product differentiation. 




























































































problem in the standard way one obtains
jv (l-e)a. tt^ =  a2(! ~ e)
Pi 2 — e ’ ; (2 — e)2( l  +  e)
* =  1,2 (13)
for firm i. From (13) it is straightforward that product differentiation is 
symmetric in our model and thus, that each firm charges the same Nash 
price. Maximizing joint profits yields
a
2 ’
n f  =
4 ( 1 + e)
< =  1 ,2 . (14)
To determine the optimal defection price p fijp f)  we have to plug pf1 into 
RFi, the reaction function of the defecting firm. Since RFt is piecewise 
linear, we actually have to consider two parts of RFi. depending on whether 
the deviator monopolizes the market during defection or whether he prefers 
to share the market with the rival (i.e. whether the optimal defection price 
lies above or below the kink of the RF{). I will call the former constraint 
and the latter unconstraint defection whenever a distinction seems to be 
necessary. Unconstrained defection profits for firm i are given by
nr = a2(2 — e)2 16(1 - e 2) (15)
while constrained defection yields
nr = a2(2e — 1) 
4e2
(16)
From the preceding discussion we know that optimal collusion is the equi­
librium result if
nf - nf < i = 1,2. (17)
We know further that (17) holds if 8 > 8*.
Now, we transfer Chang’s result for 8 < 8* to the quadratic utility 
model. Recall that Chang argued that there exists a sustainable collusive 
price p f  < pf1 for any 6 < 6*. This stems from the fact that the losses 
from deviation L(pc , 6) have the shape of a parabola increasing to infinity 




























































































see that this fairly general condition applies to the quadratic utility model 
as well. Since the model is symmetric, firms agree on one single collusive 
price p% in each market k 9. When both firms sell at pc , collusive profits 
will be given by
(1 -  e)(a -  pc )pc
11; = (18)
Note that if pc  =  pM — a/2 , I l f  =  Ilf*. A deviating firm i on the other 
hand gets
D ((1 - e ) a  +  epc Y
4(1 -  e2) l j
in the constraint region and
n f  =  (20)
in the unconstraint region. Nash profits are independent of the collusive 
price and can be taken from (13) therefore. In order to illustrate the mecha­
nism behind the collusive outcome below the joint profit maximization level, 
consider the following. Let 8 < 8* such that pM cannot be sustained in equi­
librium. Hence.
6 nf - nf 
i -  6 -  nf -  nf for n f  =  n f . ( 21)
To achieve the collusive solution firms must agree to jointly decrease pM to 
some pc  £ (pN-,pM) until (21) holds with equality. Equations (18), (19) 
and (20) indicate that, for a given e, profits from deviation as well as prof­
its from collusion decrease with decreasing pc . Since n f  remains fixed for 
different pc , it is obvious that the numerator in (21) has to decrease faster 
than the denominator if we want the left hand side of the equation to de­
crease. Comparing (18) with (19) and (20) we realize in fact that the profits 
from deviation fall much faster than the profits from collusion when lowing 
pc . In other words, through decreasing the collusive price, firms reduce the 
gains relative to the losses from deviation. Deviation becomes therefore a 
less and less preferable strategy until the discounted losses from deviation 
exceed its one- shot gains. Consequently, similar to Chang’s spatial model, 
a certain level of collusion below joint profit maximization is sustainable in 
Deneckere’s quadratic utility model for all 8 £ (0 ,6*).
9 As long as I will stick to the single market framework, I will drop the index k on the 




























































































4 Comparison between the Models and the 
Impact of Multimarket Contact
We are now ready to examine the differences between the two models in 
connection with the multimarket contact argument. First, we have to explain 
where the differences in the shape of 6* between the two models come from. 
Since 6* depends on the shape of I l f ,  I l f  and I l f  as the product space 
moves from independence (perfect heterogeneity) to perfect homogeneity, I 
will look at the differences in these profit functions.
It is straightforward that the shape of I l f  is monotonically declining 
for both models, reflecting the fact that the Nash equilibrium prices decrease 
with increasing product substitutability. Major differences occur however in 
the shape of I l f  10. In Chang’s model. I l f  rises with increasing homogeneity 
until x — 1/4 and starts to decline again until x =  1/2. In other words, the 
joint profit maximization level is highest when both firms locate at 1/4 and 
3 /4, respectively. This is due to the fact that the average transportation cost 
for all consumers is lowest at these locations. Thus, for a constant reserva­
tion price r, firms can charge the highest net price (consumer price minus 
transportation cost) from these locations provided that the two firms prefer 
to collude than to deviate. In Deneckere on the other hand, 11/ decreases 
monotonically with increasing substitutability. A declining demand for more 
homogeneous products is the underlying reason for this shape. Since the rep­
resentative consumer has a preference for variety, he will consume less the 
closer the two products are.
The difference in the shape of I l f  implies that the shape of I l f  differs 
as well between both models because the profit from deviation depends on 
the level of collusion attainable for a specific degree of product differentia­
tion. More specifically, I l f  monotonically increases in Chang’s model while 
nf in Dcneckere’s model is concave. When products are relatively weak 
substitutes, I l f  moves parallel to I l f  in both models. This is the region 
where the deviator prefers to share the market with the rival (i.e. we are 
below the kink of the reaction function in case of deviation). As products 
become closer substitutes however, I l f  does not longer move parallel to I l f  10




























































































but rises in both models. The reason for this is that a deviator prefers to 
monopolize the market during defection when products are relatively homo­
geneous. In fact, if e is close to 1, a deviating firm can capture the entire 
market for one period without lowering its defection price very much. The 
difference in the shape of lip  and I l f  as product heterogeneity varies from 
complete independence to perfect substitution is hence responsible for the 
fact that we obtain different shapes of 6* in the two models.
Now, consider Bernheim and Whinston’s argument again: firms can 
increase global profits by simultaneously increasing marginal profits in one 
market and decreasing marginal profits in another market. It was supposed 
that for a given 6. the joint profit maximization level is just sustainable in 
market a (6a =  6*) but not in market b (6b < 61) while 6 should be the same 
for both firms and markets. In general, it is not necessary that 6k — 6*k in 
one market for firms to gain from exchanging marginal profits in Chang's 
model. As long as 6k <  6k in at least one market and ea ^  eb. fims always 
gain through exchanging maginal profits across markets. As discussed in 
the previous section, there is a pk yielding lip  for each 6k £ (0 ,6k) with 
dUp /3 p £  >  0. The monotonicity of 6*k as ek approaches 1 implies then that
dTLfjdpC > dnfb/dpf 1 =  1,2  (22)
whenever ea > eb and
dnZ/dpC < ang/app 1 =  1,2  (23)
whenever ea < eb. Therefore, a different degree of product heterogeneity 
across markets ensures that firms can improve through increasing marginal 
profits in one market and decreasing marginal profits in another market.
Things may turn out to be quite different when we apply Bernheim 
and Whinston’s argumentation to the quadratic utility model. As has been 
pointed out in the previous section, Deneckere found a non-monotonic rela­
tionship between the minimum discount factor for optimal collusion 6*k and 
the degree of product differentiation. More precisely, since 6k increases and 
then decreases again with increasing product substitutability, it may well 
be that 6*a =  6*b although the degree of product differentiation across both 




























































































Proposition 2: In the quadratic utility model, the fact that ea ^  eb does 
not guarantee that multimarket contact improves a firm’s global profits even 
if 6k <  6*k in one or both markets.
To shed more light into the effect of multimarket contact in the quadratic 
utility model, let’s look at an example. Suppose the actual discount factor 
6k >  1/2 is as given in the upper diagram of Figure 3, such that bk >  6*k for 
e € (0, e') and for e £ (e", 1). These are the areas in which optimal collusion 
is sustainable in both markets independent of multimarket contact. The first 
thing to note is that if ea — e' and eb =  e", 6 =  <$* =  6%. This corresponds 
to the argument that even though ea ^  eb, the minimum discount factor 
6*k to enforce the optimal collusive outcome is the same for both markets. 
Second, for each horizontal line we draw through the curve of 6*k between e' 
and e", we find a pair of ek for which the difference between the minimum 
required discount factor and the actual discount factor b*k — bk is equal for 
k =  a,b. The dashed line in Figure 3 is an example connecting such a pair of 
product differentiation parameters ek. It is then straightforward to see that 
the collusive price pk has to be equal for k =  a.b as well (see lower diagram 
of Figure 3). Consequently,
dnZ/dpC =  &n°/dpf (24)
i.e. there is no scope for increasing global profits through swapping marginal 
profits across markets.
Intuitively, one might argue that each firm could increase its discounted 
profit stream through a segmentation of markets, e.g. firm 1 serves market 
a and firm 2 serves market b only. Thus, firms may be better off in colluding 
by creating two national monopolies than by colluding in two duopolies. 
While this solution is feasible in the homogeneous product case, it is not an 
equilibrium when products are differentiated.
Proposition 3: For all 0 <  e <  1, optimal collusion never requires firms 
to withdraw from one market and to transform markets a and market b into 
two separate monopolies.
Discounted monopoly profits in one single market exceed collusive prof­
its in the two duopolies if




























































































for firm 1, provided firm 1 would agree with firm 2 to monopolize market 
a while firm 2 monopolizes market b. Since the model is symmetric, (25) 
applies to firm 2 as well when exchanging the indices. IIiaM measures the per 
period profit collected from a national monopoly in market a whereas II ̂
are the collusive profits out of the two duopolies from equation (14). From
2
there, we can also infer that II^M =  since products are independent 
on the demand side (e =  0) if each firm restricts its activity to one single 
market. Therefore, (25) becomes
2 24  > 4
4 -  2 (1 +  e)
(26)
which never holds for 0 <  e <  1. A particular characteristic of the quadratic 
utility model can explain this result. It is implicit in the model that con­
sumers have a taste for variety and hence, consume more of the product if 
they are offered more than one variety. Consequently, the overall demand 
increases in each market when a firm enters with a new variety, thereby in­
creasing collusive profits for each firm aggregated over both markets relative 
to the profits from national monopoly 11.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have illustrated that Bernheim and Whinston’s multimar­
ket contact hypothesis for heterogeneous products is not generally valid but 
depends on the way product differentiation is modelled. Two additional 
remarks are to be made. First, the validity of Bernheim and Whinston’s 
argument in Chang’s spatial model appears to depend on a specific charac­
teristic of this model. We saw that the profits under optimal collusion were 
concave when plotted for locations x £ (0 ,1 /2 ). this shape stems from the 
fact that Chang uses a model in which firms and consumers are distributed 
over a linear space with two endpoints. However, there are other spatial
11A respecification o f the quadratic untility model such that demand remains fixed 
when product differentiation increases would modify the above result. Clearly, firms 
would be better off staying out of each other’s market if they cannot increase market 
size by introducing a new variety. For a modification o f the Spence model with constant 




























































































models that do not necessarily comprise these features, such as linear model 
without endpoints or a circular model. Generally speaking, it might be 
more reasonable for collusive profits to decrease monotonically with increas­
ing product substitutability. Therefore, it seems to me that the unconstraint 
validity of Bernheim and Whinston’s argument for different degrees of prod­
uct differentiation is a rather special phenomenon that is based on a spatial 
model such as Chang’s.
Second, if we increase the number of firms n competing in the quadratic 
utility model, we obtain a linear relationship between 6* and the degree of 
product differentiation. In particular, Martin (1989) showed that this is the 
case for n >  5. The concavity in the shape of 6* disappears thus as we move 
to a more competitive market structure. The reason for the change in the 
shape of 6* is quite clear: the more firms in the market, the less the market 
power of each firm to monopolize the market during defection.
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